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INTRODUCTION 
David Caplovitz earned a Ph.D. in Sociology from Columbia 
University in 1960, became a director of Columbia University’s 
Bureau of Applied Social Research, and then a Professor of 
Sociology at the City College of New York.1  His Ph.D. thesis, which 
investigated the spending habits of low-income urban consumers, was 
published in 1963 by the Free Press, with the title, The Poor Pay 
More.2  He is remembered today primarily for that book, and for 
other writing on the subject of the financial difficulties faced by poor 
consumers.3  The insights of David Caplovitz helped courts, law-
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 1. See Wolfgang Saxon, Dr. David Caplovitz, an Authority On Spending Habits, 
Dies at 64, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/03/obituaries/
dr-david-caplovitz-an-authority-on-spending-habits-dies-at-64.html [https://perma.cc/
Z3VG-TTHQ]. 
 2. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES (1963). 
 3. His other work on consumer finance, in chronological order, includes: David 
Caplovitz, The Consumer Behavior of Low-Income Families, Nat’l Op. Research 
Ctr., Univ. of Chi. (1961); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE EVENTS FOLLOWING UPON THE 
1320 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
makers, and many middle-class Americans appreciate the 
complicated relationship between culture, law, and the exploitation of 
poor consumers. 
This Symposium Issue is centered around the fiftieth anniversary of 
the publication of The Poor Pay More, but please note that a 
hardcover edition appeared earlier, in 1963—not 1967.  This means 
that we are celebrating, now, the fifty-fourth anniversary of the book.  
Nevertheless, I applaud the Journal for its decision to hold an event 
this year, which is the fiftieth anniversary of the paperback, and it is 
the paperback whose publication occurred at the height of its major 
impact.4 
I would like to offer a short explanation about why The Poor Pay 
More came to be among the most significant factors stimulating the 
reconstruction of consumer financial protection law in America and 
around the world. 
I.  UNRAVELING DREAMS FOR A GREAT SOCIETY 
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963 
brought with it a period of political anxiety and social upheaval.5  
                                                                                                 
DEFAULT (Bureau of Applied Research, Colum. Univ. 1970); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & 
ERIC SINGLE, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT, (Bureau of Applied Soc. Research, Colum. 
Univ. 1971); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE MERCHANTS OF HARLEM: A STUDY OF SMALL 
BUSINESS IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1973); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN 
TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, MAKING 
ENDS MEET: HOW FAMILIES COPE WITH INFLATION AND RECESSION (1979).  Other 
writings, in chronological order, include DAVID CAPLOVITZ ET AL., STUDENT-
FACULTY RELATIONS IN MEDICAL SCHOOL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Bureau of 
Applied Social Research, Colum. Univ. 1960); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & CANDACE 
ROGERS, SWASTIKA 1960: THE EPIDEMIC OF ANTI-SEMITIC VANDALISM IN AMERICA 
(Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith 1961); David Caplovitz, In the Shadows of 
the Bomb: An Inquiry into the Public Mood During the Cuban Crisis, Nat’l Op. 
Research Ctr., Univ. of Chi. (1963); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & HARRY LEVY, 
INTERRELIGIOUS DATING AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS (Bureau of Applied Soc. 
Research, Colum. Univ. 1965); NORMAN M. BRADBURN & DAVID CAPLOVITZ, 
REPORTS ON HAPPINESS (1965); David Caplovitz, The Drug Culture at the Work 
Place, 6 INT’L J. SOC. 82 (1976); David Caplovitz, Involvement in the Broad Drug 
Culture, 6 INT’L J. SOC. 111 (1976); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE WORKING ADDICT 
(1976); DAVID CAPLOVITZ & FRED SHERROW, THE RELIGIOUS DROP-OUTS: 
APOSTASY AMONG COLLEGE GRADUATES (1977); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, STUDENT-
FACULTY RELATIONS IN MEDICAL SCHOOL: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL 
SOCIALIZATION (1980); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE STAGES OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 
(1983). 
 4. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES (1967) (paperpack). 
 5. For more on the historical events described herein, fine studies of this period 
include ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES 1961–
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Hoping to mitigate traumatic discontinuity, Lyndon Johnson almost 
immediately pushed forward plans for a “War on Poverty” as well as 
a new Civil Rights Law that would, hopefully, become Kennedy’s 
legacy as well as his own.  Johnson took up these objectives and other 
measures to build a “Great Society” with the determination that the 
nation would combat racism and would combat poverty. 
But combat in Southeast Asia interrupted his domestic crusades.  
Military troops in Vietnam increased from approximately 16,000 at 
the end of 1963 to 184,000 two years later.6  The buildup did not 
defeat the enemy, however, and the difficulties of military success 
emerged through daily news reports.  The War became increasingly 
unpopular.  Particularly divisive was the class-biased, compulsory 
military draft, which depended on the urban poor and readily 
permitted college students’ deferments.  The War also devoured the 
domestic goals of the Johnson Administration.  Budgetary resources 
for the Great Society diminished, despite assurances that the nation 
could afford guns, and butter, too. 
Along with diminished resources came the disintegration of a social 
consensus over domestic priorities and methods.  The very spotlight 
that had been cast by civil rights leaders and political progressives 
also highlighted disagreements over the causes and cures for poverty 
and for racism.  From the mid-1960s, social indicators exposed a 
generational divide between young people and their elders, a divide 
over proper relations between the sexes, a divide over proper policing 
and the treatment of criminal defendants, and—perhaps most 
explosively—heightened racial antagonism. 
II.  RACE AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
During the Johnson years, violence, vandalism, and civil disorder 
appeared in scattered cities nationwide.7  During the summers of 1964 
and 1965 riots happened in Rochester, New York; Harlem; 
Philadelphia; and Watts, California.  In 1966 there were race riots in 
predominantly poor black neighborhoods in many more cities, 
including Chicago, Atlanta, Cleveland, Lancing, Michigan, and 
                                                                                                 
1973 (1999); ERIC F. GOLDMAN, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON (1969); DORIS 
KEARNS GOODWIN, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1975). 
 6. See The Vietnam War: Military Statistics, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. 
HISTORY, www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/seventies/resources/Vietnam-war-
military-statistics [https://perma.cc/N5CA-DXZR] (using statistics from the United 
States Department of Commerce). 
 7. See generally JANET L. ABU-LUGHOD, RACE, SPACE, AND RIOTS IN CHICAGO, 
NEW YORK, AND LOS ANGELES (2007). 
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Waukegan, Illinois.  The following year, 1967, brought more rioting in 
cities including Roxbury, Massachusetts; Durham, North Carolina; 
Buffalo, New York; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Cairo, Illinois; Memphis, 
Tennessee; Tampa, Florida; and Detroit, Michigan.  In 1968—the 
year in which Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were 
assassinated—there were large riots in Detroit, Chicago, and Newark.  
In nearly all of these cities, significant property destruction occurred 
as rioters trashed and burned retail stores and housing.  Shootings 
and stabbings caused injuries and fatalities.  In several cases, 
demonstrations prompted violent confrontations with police and 
guardsmen.  Business districts and white merchants appeared to be 
specifically targeted by some rioters, and in many cases the damage to 
stores was so severe that shopping districts never recovered. 
III.  THE SEARCH FOR GOOD EXPLANATIONS 
Race riots have a long, sad history in America, but the rioting in 
the 1960s was popularly understood in the white community as a new 
social pathology—frightening, mysterious and nearly 
incomprehensible.8  The compelling need to understand what was 
going on was refracted through art, entertainment, and civic 
discourse, in newspapers and magazines, and in the evening news.  
Day after day, understanding the sources for unrest in inner cities 
became an urgent concern.  While white segregationists contended 
that the riots were the result of racially integrated neighborhoods and 
the erosion of respect for law and order, white liberals and many 
leaders of the black community argued that the riots were the result 
of inadequate job opportunities, segregated housing patterns, and 
white racism more generally.9  Radicals on the Left argued that the 
riots were the inevitable, bitter fruit of class and race oppression.10 
In 1967 President Johnson established a National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, chaired by Governor Otto Kerner of 
Illinois, to determine what was happening, why it was happening, and 
                                                                                                 
 8. See id. at 3–4 (2007); Daniel J. Myers, Racial Rioting in the 1960s: An Event 
History Analysis of Local Conditions, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 94, 106 (1997) (revisiting 
data and conclusions in Seymour Spilerman, The Causes of Racial Disturbances, 35 
AM. SOC. REV. 627 (1970)); see also Virginia Postrel, The Consequences of the 1960s 
Race Riots Come Into View, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/12/30/business/the-consequences-of-the-1960s-race-riots-come-into-view.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2lnsfsH]. 
 9. See ABU-LUGHOD, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 10. See id at 4–7. 
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how it could be prevented.11  After a period of study the Commission 
offered an alarming prediction: “Our nation is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”12  A principal 
cause of urban violence, the report offered, was white racism.  The 
Commission proposed several ways to ameliorate the situation, 
including more government programs to provide social services, more 
diverse and sensitive police forces, and more investment in housing 
programs to break up residential segregation.13 
The prediction of an American version of Apartheid was ominous 
to many, however, and the suggested solutions were threatening, out 
of reach, or both.  If the root cause was really racism, that was 
incurable over any reasonable length of time, and the issue was 
uncomfortably an issue redolent with moral blame.  If it was housing 
segregation, then the solution could be prohibitively expensive, and 
take decades at best to accomplish. 
* * * 
As I have stated, The Poor Pay More had appeared more than two 
years before the major rioting, in 1963, and it was one of several 
rather dry, social-scientific efforts to address an important but not 
necessarily urgent problem.  It was not written with a popular 
audience in mind, and it was not an especially good read. 
But the need to understand causes and cures of urban poverty had 
become a cultural imperative, and thus the book’s arguments drew 
attention.  Its clinical, denatured discussion of urban poverty provided 
a much more palatable and practical explanation for the riots to the 
American center than intrinsic white racism or capitalist class 
oppression.  According to Caplovitz, the riots, above all else, reflected 
a failure to appreciate the importance of consumer finance and the 
failure to protect consumers.14 
The book reported the results of in-depth structured interviews 
with 464 families in low-income housing projects in New York City, 
and it stated its findings as sociological facts rather than policy 
judgments.15  It probed the intersection of consumer problems, race, 
                                                                                                 
 11. U.S. KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Nan Robertson, Sociologist Blames Anger at Merchants for Ghetto 
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1966, at 39, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1966/10/11/90227845.html?pageNumber=39 [https://nyti.ms/2znaWxX]. 
 15. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 2, at 2–4. 
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and poverty, using the language of empirical social science—and at a 
time when social scientific studies were broadly respected. 
Caplovitz discovered that poor families consumed high-cost 
durable goods, and paid higher prices for them than others, and yet, 
despite their cost, they were often shoddy.16  He found that they 
owned expensive items as often as people with higher income levels, 
even though less expensive ones were available for those who chose 
to be frugal.17  They bought in neighborhood stores or from peddlers, 
instead of at department stores where there was more choice and 
price variety.18  The poor bought using credit, but they were 
unsophisticated about it and ended up paying more for the money 
they borrowed.19  Because they were non-white, Caplovitz wrote, they 
were subjected to discrimination by merchants who charged them 
more for goods and more for credit.20  Additionally, because their 
creditworthiness was poor or unestablished, traditional sources of 
borrowing were closed off, and they were confined to a “deviant” 
marketing system, in which illegal and unethical selling practices 
predominated.21  They were more often the victims of oppressive debt 
collections and repossessions.22  They commonly became desperate, 
and sometimes violent, under their strain.23 
Caplovitz identified a cycle of impoverishment-by-consumption.  
Because they were young, these poor families had not yet 
accumulated savings.24  Because they were poor, they were deprived 
of status, and they were highly susceptible to advertising, which 
encouraged them to treat nonessential goods as essential 
compensation for their social position.25  Because they were just 
beginning their adult lives, they needed consumer durables and were 
eager to buy TVs, hi-fidelity stereo phonographs, and other objects 
which were widely advertised as status symbols.26  Because many 
were newcomers to cities, they were naïve about where to shop.27  
Because they were in early stages of the family-life cycle, they had 
                                                                                                 
 16. Id. at 81. 
 17. Id. at 82–87. 
 18. Id. at 84–86. 
 19. Id. at 87–90. 
 20. Id. at 90–93. 
 21. Id. at 87–90. 
 22. Id. at 157–67. 
 23. Id. at 141, 162. 
 24. Id. at 109–12. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. Id. at 48. 
 27. Id. at 49. 
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insufficient wage income for purchases, and so required credit.28  
Because these families were poor, they were denied credit at 
reputable institutions while the disreputable credit sources charged 
excessive rates.29 
The circle of impoverished consumers went round and round, 
generating great dissatisfaction, frustration, misery, and sometimes 
violence.  Poor consumers with meager consumer alternatives made 
poor choices, which led to unmanageable debts, fewer good 
purchasing alternatives, and even more extreme poverty and serious 
legal problems.30  How to break the cycle?  Caplovitz recommended 
consumer education, consumer protection rules, and different sorts of 
protective legislation.31  Consumer credit markets, except for usury 
laws, were minimally regulated and insufficient.32  New consumer 
assistance programs were imperative, as face-to-face interaction 
between consumer credit counselors and poor consumers in 
neighborhood consumer rights clinics was very important to breaking 
the cycle of poverty.33 
IV.  EXPLAINING URBAN UNREST AS CONSUMER REVOLT 
Late in 1966, the House Government Operations Committee 
invited Caplovitz to testify about his ideas, which the New York 
Times reported prominently.34  “Sociologist Blames Anger at 
Merchants for Ghetto Violence,” it reported.35  “Ghetto violence in 
Watts, Harlem and elsewhere was motivated by anger at merchants 
who bilk the poor, a Columbia University professor told Congress.”36  
Caplovitz, along with a National Crime Commission Report, asserted 
that the episodes of ghetto violence were “consumer revolts” that 
could be addressed by more aggressive actions by Federal agencies to 
“protect the American consumer.”37 
The solid logic of his theory, its grounding in data, and its 
compatibility with liberal, progressive thinking made the arguments 
compelling.  For many middle-class, white Americans, this approach 
                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 94. 
 29. Id. at 99–100. 
 30. Id. at 116–17. 
 31. See generally Hilda Siff, Book Note, 2 WELFARE IN REV. 29 (1964). 
 32. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 2, at 188–92. 
 33. See generally Siff, supra note 31. 
 34. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 39. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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had virtues: the causes of urban unrest could be addressed through 
liberal consumer reforms alone.  Because everyone in the white 
middle-class community had also experienced economic mistreatment 
at one time or another at the hands of sellers, viewing the rioting as 
an outgrowth of that mistreatment was more understandable and less 
threatening than viewing the rioting as race or capitalism-based.  
During the late 1960s, Caplovitz probed more deeply into the legal 
disadvantages associated with being a poor consumer.38  He called for 
reconsideration of basic contract law doctrine and urged government 
agencies and those trained in law to reexamine traditional concepts 
and systems.39  Freedom of contract, he said, had come into question 
because “inequality in understanding and bargaining power can yield 
bargains that the courts cannot in good conscience enforce.  Even the 
venerable status of the so-called ‘holder in due course’ . . . who takes 
a negotiable note innocently by endorsement and is freed of 
defenses” needed to be re-thought in light of the behavior of 
“unscrupulous merchants and cooperating finance companies.”40  
New laws, he wrote, should be created to regulate installment sales 
and door-to-door sales.41 
Thoughtful readers were inspired to suggest reforms of their own.  
One reader urged law students to “volunteer their services to help 
supply manpower needs” to the Caplovitz’s proposed “clinics.”42  An 
attorney in the New York Consumer Frauds Bureau elaborated on 
Caplovitz’s observation that the law’s “image of the consumer is 
incorrect since it is based on a model of a ‘sophisticated’ buyer 
whereas unsophisticated ones deserved protection for their 
reasonable consumer expectations.”43 
The Poor Pay More stimulated many of the consumer protection 
reforms that characterized the brilliant law reform efforts of the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  Law students, for instance, will surely have 
studied the Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture case, decided by 
Judge Skelly Wright, in their first-year contracts class.44  That case, 
                                                                                                 
 38. See generally, e.g., David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 
33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 641 (1968). 
 39. Id. at 653–55. 
 40. Id. at 648–49. 
 41. Id. at 652–53. 
 42. Stephen Mindell, Book Review, 10 N.Y. L.F. 288, 289 (1964); see also DAVID 
CAPLOVITZ, NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CHI., CONSUMER PROBLEMS OF 
THE LOW-INCOME 76, 85 (1964), http://www.consumerinterests.org/assets/docs/CIA/
CIA1964/1964_caplovitz.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJ7G-Q9LE]. 
 43. See Mindell, supra note 42, at 290. 
 44. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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which held that a furniture store’s contractual cross-collateralization 
provision could be considered unconscionable, was decided in 1965.  
It is likely that Judge Wright had read the hardcover volume at the 
time he recognized the sales practice in question as a form of 
oppression of low-income consumers by low-income retailers.45 
CONCLUSION 
In recent decades, the basic arguments made by Caplovitz have, 
with depressing frequency, been validated.46  There are far too many 
examples to list.  I will only mention two: one I consider tragic and 
one that is in itself somewhat trivial and comic. 
A study of the treatment of consumers by credit card issuers in the 
wake of hurricane Katrina, in 2009 found—tragically, I think—that 
magnanimity toward victims varied depending on their affluence.47  
Despite the most catastrophic of circumstances affecting their 
customers, most credit card issuers started insisting on repayment of 
non-premium credit card balances, charging over-the-limit fees, and 
reporting damaging information to credit agencies just three months 
after the storm.48  Thousands of consumer bankruptcies and 
uncalculated additional interest charges resulted.49  On the other 
hand, beginning immediately after the hurricane, holders of the 
BellSouth Platinum MasterCard and the BellSouth Platinum Business 
MasterCard were directly transferred to specially trained Chase 
customer service teams and were afforded emergency credit line 
increases, removal of minimum payment requirements, courtesy fee 
waivers, overnight emergency card replacements, and other 
                                                                                                 
 45. See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the 
Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1399 (2014); see also J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have 
Failed the Poor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 1969, at 26, 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/03/09/90061728.html?pageNum
ber=347 [https://nyti.ms/2zpKKCI]. 
 46. See generally, e.g., DONALD HIRSCH, CONSUMER FUTURES, ADDRESSING THE 
POVERTY PREMIUM: APPROACHES TO REGULATION (2013); Howard Jacob Karger, 
The “Poverty Tax” and America’s Low-Income Households, 88 FAMS. SOC’Y: J. 
CONTEMP. SOC. SERVS. 413 (2007) (recognizing that although low-income U.S. 
households account for more than $650 billion a year in buying power, they still pay 
more for basic goods and services than high-income households). 
 47. See Norman I. Silber, Thriving on Adversity: Corporate Treatment and 
Mistreatment of Consumers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 22 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 139, 147 (2009); see also Norman I. Silber, Debts, Disasters, and 
Delinquencies: A Case for Placing a Mandatory Force Majeure Provision into 
Consumer Credit Agreements, 34 N.Y. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 760, 761 (2010). 
 48. See Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 47, at 147–48. 
 49. Id. at 149–50. 
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privileges.50  Preferred MasterCard holders could defer payments and 
receive waivers of late and over-limit fees.51  None of their accounts 
would be reported to credit bureaus as delinquent.52  These privileges 
were not conferred upon all of Chase’s customers.53 
Comical, but offering an insight into more disturbing phenomena, 
is the story told recently on a Washington Post blog about two 
investigators at the University of Michigan who established, 
rigorously, that the poor even pay more for toilet paper.54  With a 
data base of 100,000 American households over seven years, they 
tracked nearly 3 million toilet paper purchases and found that the 
poor were less likely than wealthier households to buy bigger 
packages, or to time their purchases to take advantage of sales.55  By 
failing to do so, they paid about 5.9% more per sheet of toilet paper, a 
little less than what they saved by buying cheaper brands in the first 
place (8.8%).56 
* * * 
The contributors to this Symposium Issue of the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal carry forward the inquiry into the necessity for better 
understanding the role of consumer law in the perpetuation of 
poverty, injustice, and social disorder.  In the United States, and all 
over the world, social scientists and lawyers continue to confirm that 
the poor too often do pay more. 
                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 168–69. 
 51. Id. at 169. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Emily Badger, Why the Poor Pay More for Toilet Paper—And Just About 
Everything Else, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/08/why-the-poor-pay-more-
for-toilet-paper-and-just-about-everything-else [https://perma.cc/V8DA-8HRU]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
